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Automotive Hot Topics

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AUTOMOTIVE
SOFTWARE



Automotive Software

Christof Ebert, Vector Consulting Services


John Favaro, Intecs



SOFTWARE IS THE number-one decisive competitive factor in the automotive industry. Innovations such as driver-assistance systems and


energy-efficient driving require complex solutions with complex software functionality. Not only must the growing complexity be managed

Deep Learning in Automotive Software



Fabio Falcini and Giuseppe Lami, Information Science and Technologies Institute of the National Research Council of Italy

Alessandra Mitidieri Costanza, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles



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4,2 mt

Supporting the Management of Reusable Automotive Software

Xabier Larrucea, Tecnalía

Alastair Walker, Lorit Consultancy

Ricardo Colomo-Palacios, Østfold University College

are taken into account (and are represented graphically) and are related to requirements and design parts.

One relevant activity is to identify which artifacts suggested by ISO 26262 are in the assurance project. These artifacts are evidence supporting our arguments and help us automatically check ISO 26262 compliance. The left side of Figure 5 shows the repository explorer, which stores arguments, assurance projects, evidence, and processes. The right side shows a tree view of artifacts for our SEooC.

A compliance management panel (see Figure 6) summarizes which ISO 26262 requirements our project has fulfilled and to what extent we covered all the requirements. This panel (which is connected to a webserver) manages the list of baseline elements that our assurance project should satisfy (see the left side of Figure 6). For each ISO 26262 requirement,

the compliance status is highlighted in green, orange, or red. The panel also indicates the impact-analysis (IA) status, which is used when the evidence has changed.

of functional-safety requirements by using tools that support not just safety case diagrams but also evidence and compliance. Second, engineers must be aware of the evidence supporting each decision, even at the architectural level.

Using OpenCert for the Hall-sensor-based SEooC taught us two main things. First, you should combine the analysis of assumptions and the analysis

This approach is being improved under the European AMASS (Architecture-Driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance and Certification of Cyber-physical Systems; www





FIGURE 5. A chunk of our SEooC project evidence. The left side shows the repository explorer, which stores arguments, assurance projects, evidence, and processes. The right side shows a tree view of artifacts for our SEooC.



FIGURE 6. The compliance management panel summarizes which ISO 26262 requirements our project has fulfilled and to what extent we've covered all the requirements.

Arguing Compliance



OPENCOSS Administration Help

Project: SEooCHallSensor Reports Argumentation Evidence Process

Compliance report

Baseline Framework: ISO 26262 Export to MS Word

Project Compliance

Overall compliance status: -

Type	Baseline Element Name	Compliance Status	IA Status
📄	2-5.5.1 Organization-specific rules and processes for functional safety	Compliant	🟢
📄	2-5.5.2 Evidence of competence	Partial	🟢
📄	2-5.5.3 Evidence of quality management	Compliant	🟢
📄	2-5.3.2.1 Evidences of a quality management system	Not compliant	🟢
📄	2-6.3.2.1 Project Plan	-	-
📄	2-6.3.2.2 Other safety activities	Compliant	🟢
📄	2-6.5.1 Safety Plan	-	-

Base Asset Compliance Details

Selected Baseline Element Name: 2-5.5.1 Organization-specific rules and processes for functional safety
Compliance Status: The evidence presented below is fully compliant with the selected baseline asset.

Add a compliance evidence to this project baseline element.
 Please drag and drop a file to this area or press [Upload](#)

Note: Pressing [Assign] button will commit your file to SVN and assign it as a compl evidence.

Details: [\[Expand to Justification\]](#) [\[Expand to Asset\]](#) [\[Expand to Resou\]](#)

Compliance Justification: Fully compliant. Fully

Description: A company should organize specific rules and processes for

Secure Automotive Software

The Next Steps

Lee Pike, Jamey Sharp, Mark Tullsen, Patrick C. Hickey, and James Bielman, Galois

improving software quality,⁹ such as using version control, unit testing, integrated testing, and code reviews. The Motor Industry Software Reliability Association's *Development Guidelines for Vehicle Rated Software* already recommends these approaches,¹⁰ so we don't discuss them here.

The following recommendations typically go beyond the automotive industry's current standard practices. Table 1 summarizes the recommendations, organized into four areas: compile-time assurance, runtime protection, automated testing, and architectural security.

TABLE 1 Recommendations for improving automotive-software security.

Area	Recommendations
Compile-time assurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Static analysis • Memory-safe programming • Formal verification
Runtime protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • System specification • Measurement and attestation • Cryptography • Runtime verification
Automated testing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fuzz testing • Property-based testing
Architectural security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trusted interfaces • Software isolation • Obfuscation

Compile-Time Assurance
Compile-time assurance happens before code execution. We present the recommendations in the increasing order of engineering effort.

Static analysis Static analysis tries to discover software flaws without execution or testing, and many tools are commercially available. Some tools are sound; that is, they shouldn't produce false negatives. To improve scalability and reduce false positives, some tools are *unsound* and can be considered advanced bug-hunting tools.

SAE J3061 recommends using static analysis, and we do too. However, although static analysis is powerful, it can lead to a false sense of security. Furthermore, static-analysis tools can produce so many false positives that discerning legitimate vulnerabilities is difficult. Finally, static analysis is unreliable for automatically uncovering domain-specific bugs.

Memory-safe programming Microsoft discovered that the Pareto principle applies to software quality: 80

percent of Windows and Office errors and crashes came from 20 percent of the bugs.¹¹ We conjecture that the principle applies more generally to software security: 80 percent of exploits come from 20 percent of the classes of vulnerabilities.

For example, all the UCSD-UW attacks on short- and long-range wireless systems depended on exploiting buffer overflows.¹² Buffer overflows are a rudimentary vulnerability known since at least 1972.¹³ They're a particular example of a memory-safety violation, which is an example of undefined behavior. Coding standards and static analysis target mostly the prevention and discovery, respectively, of undefined behavior resulting from using "unsafe" programming languages such as C or C++.

We propose that the most expedient way to improve software security is to use memory-safe languages. Safe-C languages are memory-safe and suitable for embedded programming. They guarantee memory safety while still allowing programmers fine-grained control of memory use and timing.


We developed the safe-C language Ivory¹⁴ to support the HACMS program. Ivory is a secure alternative to C/C++ in which memory-safety errors are impossible; it supports a variety of verification tools. The HACMS program used Ivory to develop secure avionics with no memory-safety vulnerabilities.

Formal verification Whereas testing provides partial assurance about the actual artifact to be fielded (because one more test vector might uncover a vulnerability), formal verification provides complete assurance about a model of the system. With testing, the designer's worry is, "Have I tested enough?" With formal verification, the worry is, "Is my model's fidelity accurate enough?"¹⁵


Formal verification requires a two-step approach: build a model, then verify it. Both steps are usually partly manual. Because of the effort involved, formal verification is the most cost-effective for critical, well-defined components. One example is embedded OSs.¹⁶ Another example is specific control systems. These systems are particularly difficult to

Future Automotive Architecture and the Impact of IT Trends

Matthias Traub, Alexander Maier, and Kai L. Barbehön
BMW




Central Computing Platforms




(Traub et al.)

Tools – Today



(Traub et al.)

Tools – Tomorrow?



(Traub et al.)

Resources

The Guest Editor Introduction to the Special Issue may be downloaded here:

<https://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/so/2017/03/mso2017030033.pdf>

The article on Future Automotive Architecture may be downloaded here:

<https://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/so/2017/03/mso2017030027.pdf>

The article on Deep Learning may be downloaded here:

<https://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/so/2017/03/mso2017030056.pdf>

There is a companion set of resources at the IEEE Software *Computing Now* site:



<https://www.computer.org/web/computingnow/archive/automotive-software-may-2017-introduction>

THANK YOU !



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